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ABSTRACT
Quantitative analysis of patent behavior is critical, as congressional and regulatory
agencies consider the impact of patent trolling on modern markets. Anecdotal evidence has
suggested that “non-practicing entities,” also known as “patent trolls,” specifically target
companies for lawsuits, licensing demands, or other monetization activity as firms approach
or complete major funding events, such as their initial public offering (IPO). To test this
narrative, we survey in-house legal staff at companies that have recently gone public about
their exposure to patent demands surrounding their first round of venture capital funding
and their IPO. The study is one of the first attempts at providing quantitative insight into this
potential strategic behavior both in and out of the courtroom.
We find evidence supporting extensive patent demand activity near IPOs, one of the
most public and vulnerable periods of a company’s development. A significant proportion of
recently public companies received patent demands either shortly before or after their IPO,
with the majority of this activity originating from non-practicing entities. The effects are
especially pronounced for information technology companies. Our results are yet another
indication that patent assertion activity is driven by issues other than the merits of individual
patent claims.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents the results of a survey conducted to study the topic of
patent demands and how they affect recently public companies. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that both competitors and monetizers, colloquially known as
“patent trolls,” may opportunistically time their patent demand activity to major
funding events in a company’s development. Such demands may include both the
threat of legal action as well as the initiation of actual litigation. The study
explored this issue by surveying recently public companies about their exposure to
patent demand activity surrounding two major funding events in a company’s
development: the first round of venture capital funding and the completion of the
initial public offering (IPO).
After an exhaustive search process, over 550 U.S. product companies were
identified that issued IPOs between 2007 and 2012. The paper details responses
from in-house staff, most often the general counsel, of over 50 of these product
companies. The results provide quantitative information on the companies’
exposure to patent demand activity at each of four periods: the period before
receiving the first round of venture capital funding, the year after receiving the
first round of funding, the period between officially declaring an intent to go
public and issuing an IPO, and the year following the completion of the IPO. For
each period, information is available about whether the company received patent
demands, the number received, and the origin of the demands. The paper also
includes results about exposure to patent demands depending on industry. In
particular, we compared patterns of exposure faced by companies in information
technology, the life sciences, and clean energy.
Results also include subjective views of respondents. Specifically, company
lawyers reported on whether patent demands pose a problem to companies in
their sectors and whether patent demands have had an impact on their companies.
Respondents also provide rough estimates of the costs their companies have
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incurred to prepare for or defend against patent demands. Finally, respondents had
the opportunity to provide free-response comments on the impact of patent
demands on their companies and general comments about the topic of patent
demands.
The results provide important observational data on strategic behavior in the
market for patent monetization. In particular, the results provide evidence of a
tactical strategy among monetizers to pursue demands against companies during
one of the most public and vulnerable periods of a company’s development —the
completion and aftermath of its IPO. The results were particularly striking for
companies in the information technology industry that went public.
In contrast, we did not find systematic evidence that companies were targeted
with patent demands near their early funding rounds after formation. For
example, none of the information technology companies reported receiving patent
demands in the periods immediately before or after their first round of venture
capital funding. In contrast, roughly 60% of information technology respondents
reported receiving patent demands in the periods around the company’s IPO.
Similar but less dramatic patterns were observed for the small sets of life science
and clean energy companies that responded.
The key findings from the study include the following:
• Very few respondents reported receiving patent demands before the
first round of venture capital funding or in the year following the
first round.
• Nearly half of respondents reported patent demand activity in the
period surrounding the IPO —either during the short period from
the time of the public announcement to the actual IPO, or in the year
following the IPO.
• Of the companies that received patent demands in the year following
the IPO, half said they received four or more patent demands during
this period, and more than 80% said some of the activity against them
originated from patent monetizers.
• The large majority of patent demand activity near IPOs was against
companies with revenues above $50 million at the time of their IPOs.
• None of the information technology companies surveyed reported
receiving patent demands before the first round of venture funding
or in the year following the first round.
• Roughly 60% of the information technology companies reported
receiving patent demands in the periods surrounding their IPOs.
• Almost all patent demand activity against information technology
companies originated from monetizers.
• Most companies said patent demands are a problem in their sector,
with all information technology companies agreeing that patent
demands are problematic for their industry.
• Nearly half of companies, and more than two-thirds of information
technology companies, said they had spent more than $250,000
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preparing for or defending against patent demands.
For readers who are less familiar with survey and empirical data, we note that
the results are observational in nature. Larger sample sizes and response rates are
necessary for generalizable results, and we look forward to additional work by
academics across time that may provide replication on a larger scale.
A. Background on the Extent of Modern Patent Monetization
While patent monetization is not a particularly new concept, it is only
recently that the market for this strategy has experienced dramatic growth. For
example, approximately 2,500 patent lawsuits were filed in 2007; by 2012, the
number of lawsuits had doubled to more than 5,000. 1
Nearly all of this growth resulted from increased activity by patent
monetizers. Monetizers filed 428 patent lawsuits in 2007— that number grew to
2,750 in 2012, an increase of more than 600%. 2 In addition, by 2012, lawsuits by
monetizers represented the most common type of patent litigation, increasing
from about 20% of lawsuits in 2007 to nearly 60%. 3 The increase in patent
litigation across this time period was observed in both the number of lawsuits filed
and the number of defendants sued. Although the number of defendants declined
after passage of the America Invents Act in 2011, the levels remain far above those
observed in 2007. 4
Before continuing, it should be noted that the terminology used to describe
the actors involved in patent monetization has been, and still is, subject to
politically charged debate. 5 Government agencies, academics, and journalists use
terms including “non-practicing entity” (NPE), “patent assertion entity” (PAE), and
the popular colloquialism, “patent troll,” to label actors in the patent assertion
landscape. 6 In this paper, we use a purposefully broad, simple term— “patent
monetizer,” defined as any entity or individual whose core business involves

1. See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of
UCLA
J.L.
&
TECH.
1,
42
(2013),
Patent
Monetization
Entities,
17
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2013/041024-Feldman.pdf [http://perma.cc/9RET3ERZ]; see also Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in United States District Courts: 1994 to 2014,
(forthcoming IOWA L. REV.) (finding that patent litigation volume doubled from 2010 to 2013)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570803.
2. Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, AIA 500 Expanded, supra note 1, at 42.
3. Id. The actual percentages vary slightly depending on whether individuals and trusts,
which often behave similarly to patent monetizers, are included as monetizers for calculation
purposes.
4. For a description of the possible impact of the America Invents Act on patent
litigation, see id. at 43-57.
5. See generally Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the
Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 244-54 (2014),
http://yjolt.org/sites/default/files/Feldman-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EDU-U2J9] (discussing in
detail the choice of “terms and points of measurement” when studying patent assertion).
6. Id.
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licensing or litigating patents rather than making products. The use of “patent
monetizer” ensures that all actors involved in revenue generation using patents are
included in the discussion, regardless of the actions they take to do so or how they
are organized. It also makes no judgment as to the legitimacy or acceptability of an
actor’s behavior or business dealings. However, when discussing previous work by
another author, we will preserve the author’s choice of terminology.
Although the number of lawsuits filed by monetizers has increased notably,
the main engine for profit generation is not collecting damages from a decision on
the merits in court. In fact, the complexity of the patent system and high costs of
litigation encourage settlements and extraction of licensing fees regardless of
whether the patent holder is likely to prevail. For example, Chien found that
fighting a PAE demand through litigation costs companies approximately
$850,000 on average. 7 Meanwhile, settling costs an average of only $340,000, and
fighting out of court resulted in expenses of $170,000. 8 Such non-litigation
options were not only cheaper, but also considerably more popular for defendants
than choosing to work through the entire litigation process. Bessen and Meurer
reported similar mean legal costs of about $420,000 for small or medium-sized
companies and $1.52 million for large companies responding to a NPE demand. 9
One major result of this phenomenon is that patent demands —including
litigation or the threat of litigation —have become an unpleasant part of life for
many growing product companies, especially startup companies in the technology
sector. In a 2013 survey, Chien found that 75% of venture capitalists had received
NPE demands against at least one company in their portfolio, and 20% of all
venture-backed startup companies surveyed had received demands. 10 Feldman,
conducting a similar survey, found that 70% of venture capitalists have
experienced demands against a portfolio company, while 31% of venture-backed
companies independently reported demands against them. 11 Respondents in the
Feldman study also reported that a majority of these demands originated from
monetizers. 12
Patent lawsuits overwhelmingly affect companies with small revenues and the
least ability to defend against patent demands through expensive litigation. In
another study, Chien found that companies with less than $10 million in revenue
7. Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 472-73 & 473
tbl.1 (2014), http://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-lawreview/online/startupsandpatenttrolls.pdf [http://perma.cc/ELP7-Q9LX].
8. Id. at 462, 465, & 473.
9. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 387, 397-400 (2014), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2014/01/99CLR387.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7HPH-3WSD]. Small and medium firms were defined as companies with less
than $1 billion in annual revenue. Large companies exceeded $1 billion in annual revenue.
10. Colleen V. Chien, White Paper for the Open Technology Institute, Patent Assertion
AMERICA
FOUNDATION
(2013)
at
10-11,
and
Startup
Innovation,
NEW
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321340 [http://perma.cc/MM6C-YN7T].
11. Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies, supra note 5, at 263-65.
12. Id. at 266-67.
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make up more than half of unique defendants in PAE lawsuits. 13 According to
Bessen and Meurer, companies with less than $100 million in annual revenue
make up as much as 82% of defendants in NPE lawsuits. 14 Meanwhile, operating
companies only sued companies with less than $10 million in annual revenue 16%
of the time. 15 These small companies find themselves most vulnerable to strategies
based on the economics of patent litigation, with settlement often being the most
attractive option regardless of the merits of the demand.
The majority of targets of patent assertions are technology and software
companies. According to Chien, nearly 90% of technology venture capitalists have
faced demands against a portfolio company, 16 and Feldman found that 70% of
venture capitalists have experienced demands against an information technology
portfolio company. 17 Feldman also reported that the percentages were far smaller
for venture capitalists in other sectors. 18 More generally, the patents asserted in
litigation are largely software, technology, or Internet-related patents. In an
examination of NPE lawsuits, Bessen, Ford, and Meurer found that 62% of these
suits involved software patents. 19 Chien and Karkhanis reported that up to 82% of
lawsuits filed by PAEs were based on a software patent, compared to just 30% of all
non-PAE lawsuits. 20 Meanwhile, Allison, Lemley, and Walker found that almost
94% of assertions of the most litigated patents —patents that are the subject of
eight or more lawsuits —involved software patents. 21 Allison, Tiller, Zyontz, and
Bligh reported that Internet patents were 7.5 to 9.5 times more likely than nonInternet patents to be the subject of infringement litigation. 22

13. Chien, supra note 7, at 471.
14. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 9, at 397-98; see also id. at 398 n.57 (explaining that

making this estimate requires an assumption that firms with unreported revenue have revenues
less than $100 million), Chien, supra note 7, at 464 (reporting a wider range of 66-82% using the
RPX Corporation database from Bessen & Meurer).
15. Chien, supra note 7, at 464.
16. Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, supra note 10, at 10-11 & fig.1.
17. Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies, supra note 5, at 265.
18. Id.
19. James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent
Winter
2011-2012,
at
26,
29
tbl.2,
Trolls,
REG.,
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/5/v34n4-1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/54C4-Q6BN].
20. Colleen Chien & Aashish Karkhanis, Software Patents & Functional Claiming,
Presentation to the Software Patent & Trademark Office Roundtable at Stanford Law School
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/603 [http://perma.cc/K4KNYTXE].
21. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 696 (2011).
22. John R. Allison, Emerson H. Tiller, Samantha Zyontz & Tristan Bligh, Patent Litigation
and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 4 (2012).
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Behind much of this litigation are software patents of low quality. In a 2013
survey, Chien noted complaints from numerous venture capitalists and startup
companies about poor patent quality. Respondents called many software patents
“not novel” and said “many obvious things are patented.”23 Using a probit model,
Miller estimated that 39% of software patents and 56% of business method patents
(often software patents themselves) could be found at least partially invalid,
compared to 28% of all patents. 24 And in practice, software patent owners are far
less likely to win their cases than owners of non-software patents. Allison, Tiller,
Zyontz, and Bligh found that software patentees won less than 13% of their cases,
compared to 37% of cases won by non-software patentees. 25
The impact of patent demands is substantial. Bessen and Meurer estimated the
direct aggregate cost of NPE patent assertions to be $29 billion in 2011, a more
than four-fold increase from 2007. 26 That figure includes only direct business and
legal costs to U.S. companies —the indirect effects are also large. For example,
patent demands can lead to “significant operational impacts,” including loss of
clients, hiring delays, changes to products, or a complete exit from a business. 27
Pending demands and litigation can also lead to a reduction in a company’s
valuation. 28
Most important, in what economists are calling the “leaky bucket,” little of the
23. See Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, supra note 10, at 15 (quoting one
startup respondent as saying, “[i]n the case of software patents, not only is there significant prior
art in a large percentage of cases, but most software patents are not novel: someone had a need
to do something, and created it,” and another as saying, “the biggest problem with patents is in
the software world, where many obvious things are patented.”). For a discussion of why
software patents tend to be problematic, see ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 104-124
(Harvard 2012); Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Robin Feldman and the U.C. Hastings Institute
for Innovation Law on Behalf of Neither Party, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.
Ct.
2347
(2014)
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/13298_np_amcu_prof-rf.authcheckdam.pdf.
24. Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of
Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6-7 (2013).
25. Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 21, at 696 & tbl.10. These percentages consider
only patent owner wins and defendant wins on the merits, and exclude default judgments and
settlements; see also id. at 693-94 & tbl.8 (describing how NPEs were also found to have a
significantly lower win rate, winning only 8% of their cases, compared to 40% of cases won by
product companies).
26. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 9, at 408 & tbl.4.
27. See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 7, at 474 (defining a “significant
operational impact” as resulting in “a business strategy pivot, product change, business/business
line exit, delay in hiring or meeting operational milestone, and/or a reduction in the value of the
company.”).
28. Id.; see also Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, supra note 10, at 12 (“Having
an outstanding patent lawsuit . . . can cause a company to be devalued significantly, for example,
by 20%.”) [http://perma.cc/MM6C-YN7T].
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money paid to monetizers flows back to invention and innovation. 29 Rather, only
an estimated 20% of payments to NPEs flows back to inventors or to internal
research and development. 30
Among all of this assertion activity, there are undoubtedly monetizers who
have targeted valid patents against companies that have clearly infringed those
patents. It is also true that a small inventor is at a severe disadvantage asserting a
patent on its own against a large infringer. The complexity and expense of the
patent system has always been daunting for small players in the field. The concern,
however, is that the economics of patent litigation may be encouraging strategic
behavior that can be harmful to innovation. Rather than returning money to
inventors small and large, we may be incentivizing vast amounts of wasteful
activity.
Legislators and policymakers have taken note of the rapid rise in patent
demands by monetizers, leading to new and proposed regulation as well as a spike
in common law decisions. The America Invents Act, which took effect in 2011,
introduced numerous reforms to the patent system. As it pertains to patent
monetizers, the Act changed joinder rules that apply to patent lawsuits, making it
more difficult to include multiple defendants in the same lawsuit. 31 The House of
Representatives approved another patent reform bill in 2013 mainly pertaining to
litigation reform. 32 The bill died in the Senate, but multiple reform bills are now
back under consideration. 33 At least 20 states have passed legislation since 2013
targeting instances of bad faith patent assertion, with bills introduced in others. 34
29. Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J.
463, 482-82 (2014).
30. See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Mean Innovation?, IOWA L.
REV.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
6),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2565292 [http://perma.cc/2WRM-8TQV]
(citing Bessen & Meurer, supra note 9, at 423).
31. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012).
32. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013).
33. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015); Protecting American Talent and
Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015).
34. Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (last visited Apr. 1,
2014),
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresssguide-state-patent-legislation [http://perma.cc/3728-QQ9S]. See, e.g., Bad Faith Assertions of
Patent Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199 (West, Westlaw through 2013-2014
Sess.) (delineating factors that courts can consider as evidence of bad faith assertions of patent
infringement, and creating remedies and enforcement policies, thereby making it the first state
to pass legislation against patent trolling). In many other states, the acts signed into law are
nearly identical to the Vermont legislation. See, e.g., Actions for Bad Faith Assertion of Patent
Infringement, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701-8702 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 1); Bad
Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement, VA. CODE ANN. tit. 59.1, §§ 59.1-215.1 – 59.1-215.4
(West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 1); Patent Infringement Claims, MO. ANN. STAT., tit. 26, §§
416.650-416.658 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
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Outside of legislation, multiple commissions and agencies have considered the
issue of patent assertion in particular. The White House issued executive orders
and a report on patent assertion in 2013, 35 while the Federal Trade Commission
has opened an investigation focusing on the economic effects of 25 patent
monetizers. 36
The Supreme Court has also joined the conversation, handing down six
patent-related decisions during the 2013-2014 term. In comparison, the Court
heard only five patent cases in the 15 years after the creation of the Federal Circuit
in 1982. 37 Each decision last term walked back Federal Circuit logic and curtailed
some of the broad powers enjoyed by patent holders. 38 Notably, in Nautilus v.
Biosig, a unanimous Court overturned a Federal Circuit rule that patent claims may
contain ambiguity as long as the claims are not “insolubly ambiguous,” possibly
setting a lower bar for overturning patents for indefiniteness. 39 In Octane Fitness,
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., the Court ruled that the Federal Circuit’s
standard for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in patent cases was
“unduly rigid.”40 The Patent Act contains a fee-shifting provision that allows
district courts to award attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases,”41 which the Federal
Circuit had defined as cases that involve inappropriate conduct or are both
“objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.”42 Noting that this
framework is “too restrictive” and covers conduct that is already “independently
sanctionable,”43 the Court also ruled that the Federal Circuit’s evidentiary standard
of clear and convincing evidence for fee recovery was unjustified, finding that a
preponderance of the evidence standard is used in most other patent infringement
litigation. 44 The decision in Octane, along with the opinion in a closely related
case, Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 45 may help to decrease
the effectiveness of monetizer strategies by introducing a greater risk that a losing

35. See Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (June
2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9C2X-VPYD].
36. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion
Entities and Their Impact on Innovation, Competition (September 27, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertionentities-their-impact [http://perma.cc/ZRB9-FVZ9].
37. Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 27 (2014),
http://www.greenbag.org/v18n1/v18n1_articles_feldman.pdf [http://perma.cc/LEE5-8F4M].
38. See generally id. (discussing the evolving relationship between the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit).
39. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
40. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014).
41. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
42. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Intern., Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (2005).
43. Octane, 134 S.Ct. at 1756-57.
44. Id. at 1758.
45. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1744 (2014).
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monetizer will be responsible for attorney’s fees. 46
The increasing level of interest in patent monetization has led to novel
research on the topic. However, while many studies use litigation data, few patent
demands actually progress to a lawsuit. Threats of litigation and licensing requests
take place in a realm outside of the courthouse, making up the large majority of
demand activity, 47 and information about this substantial activity is not covered
by litigation data sets. Further, these non-court interactions are often obscured
and hidden by nondisclosure agreements and fears of retaliation. 48 Therefore,
anonymous surveys, such as the one presented in this paper, are an important tool
for beginning to understand the full landscape of patent assertion.
B. An Overview of Initial Public Offerings and Patent Monetization
An initial public offering can offer a growing and successful company many
benefits, including an injection of capital, a liquidity event for existing
shareholders, and extensive press and publicity, among others. 49 Yet accessing
these rewards requires a costly and laborious preparation and filing process,
involving coordinated efforts in reporting, auditing, due diligence, underwriting,
public relations, and marketing. The required SEC registration forms —most
notably, Form S-1 —must offer detailed information about a company’s finances,
structure, and risks. For many companies, this represents an extensive disclosure
of proprietary and sensitive information theretofore unreleased to the public. 50

46. See Feldman, Coming of Age, supra note 37, at 35 (discussing these cases in more detail).
47. Estimates of the number of patent threats range from 60,000 to more than 100,000

per year. See Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC Workshop on
PAEs (Dec. 10,
2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314
[http://perma.cc/XPY4-K6JS] (noting that at least 2500 PAE lawsuits were filed in 2012 and
then claiming that the total number of demands is 25 to 50 times that amount); see also Executive
Office of the President, supra note 35, at 6 (originally performing the calculation using the data
from Chien).
48. See, e.g., Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, This American Life: When Patents Attack!
(National
Public
Radio
broadcast
July
22,
2011),
transcript
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/transcript
[http://perma.cc/6FPV-2Y5P] (“[W]e called people who had licensing arrangements with [a
monetizer]. We called people who were defendants in lawsuits involving [the monetizer’s]
patents. We called every single company being sued by [another monetizer]. No one would talk
to us.”); see also Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (2012), (describing similar issues in uncovering information about patent monetizers).
49. See Elizabeth Myers, Bill Contente, Michael Millman & Christopher Roberts (on
behalf of J.P. Morgan), Why Go Public?, in NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE IPO GUIDE 9, 10 (2013),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/nyse_ipo_guide.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HP2L7WEH] (explaining advantages of conducting an IPO); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
ROADMAP FOR AN IPO: A GUIDEMAP FOR GOING PUBLIC 3
(2011),
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/roadmap-to-anipo.pdf [http://perma.cc/3Y6B-AZ4V] (discussing potential advantages of going public).
50. But see Jeffrey R. Vetter & William H. Hughes (on behalf of Fenwick & West LLP),
The IPO On-Ramp Under the JOBS Act, in NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE IPO GUIDE, supra note 49,
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Soon-to-be public companies must also extensively market themselves through a
traditional “IPO roadshow,” where companies hold meetings across the world to
meet with investors, with the hopes of convincing them to purchase shares during
the IPO. 51
The public display, lasting about three to four months from the initial
organizational meeting to the first day of trading, 52 makes a company uniquely
vulnerable to unfavorable events and negative press that could adversely affect its
share price, valuation, and investor interest in the IPO. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that patent monetizers and competitors are taking advantage of this
vulnerability by issuing patent demands to companies during their filing period
and shortly after the completion of the IPO. In a 2013 Reuters report on patent
lawsuits, this potential pattern of patent demands was accepted as fact— just part
of the path to an IPO: “Patent claims against companies approaching an IPO are
relatively common, as plaintiffs hope the need for a target company to minimize
risks might force a lucrative settlement.”53
Much of the evidence for this timing originates from reported events in the
press. For example, just three days before its November 2013 IPO, Twitter
disclosed in an updated S-1 that it had received a letter from IBM alleging that
Twitter had infringed on three IBM patents. 54 This addition of approximately
eight lines to the “Risk Factors” section of a 250-page document made news in
outlets including the Wall Street Journal and Reuters. 55 Four months later, Twitter
purchased 900 patents from IBM to settle the dispute, providing an example of
at 43, 44-45, for a discussion of how recent legislation allows certain eligible emerging growth
companies to make confidential submissions of the draft registration statements in the early
stages of the filing process. However, a public filing of the registration statement is still required
at least 21 days before the start of the IPO roadshow.
51. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 49, at 51-52 (describing the purpose and
format of an IPO roadshow).
52. See Elizabeth Myers, Bill Contente, Michael Millman & Christopher Roberts (on
behalf of J.P. Morgan), The IPO Process, in NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE IPO GUIDE, Myers et al.,
supra note 49, at 31, 32-33 (outlining a standard timeline for the IPO process).
53. Dan Levine, In Patent Showdown, IBM’s Arsenal Drafts Twitter’s, REUTERS, Nov. 4,
2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/us-twitter-patentsidUSBRE9A30ZW20131104 [http://perma.cc/6ZBS-E295].
54. Compare Twitter, Inc., Securities Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 35
(November
4,
2013),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA2F526X/3989352158x0xs1193125%2D13%2D424260/1418091/filing.pdf
[http://perma.cc/76KP-QJA6] (including the IBM disclosure) with Twitter, Inc., Securities
Registration
Statement
(Form
S-1/A),
at
35
(October
24,
2013),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA2F526X/3989352158x0xS1193125%2D13%2D409822/1418091/filing.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EUY5-4RZF] (showing the previous version of the S-1 filing without the IBM
disclosure).
55. See Telis Demos, Yoree Koh & Matt Jarzemsky, Twitter Raises Sights in Heady IPO
Market,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Nov.
4,
2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303482504579177541101538338
[http://perma.cc/SHW2-TK8G]; see also Levine, supra note 53.
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companies stockpiling patents as a defense against further threats and litigation. 56
Developments in ongoing litigation also can have an impact that may affect
share prices, investor interest, and even the timing of the IPO. When GrubHub
Seamless, an online food-ordering company, filed the first version of its S-1 in
February 2014, the company disclosed that it was currently defending itself against
patent infringement lawsuits involving its online ordering systems. 57 The lawsuits
were filed by Ameranth, a known patent monetizer that earns the majority of its
revenue by collecting payments on patents. 58 On March 26, 2014, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office denied a petition filed by GrubHub and 34 other entities
asking for patent review, finding that the petition did “not establish that at least
one of the challenged claims is more likely than not unpatentable.”59 The decision
essentially allowed Ameranth’s lawsuits against GrubHub to move forward.
However, Ameranth did not publicly announce that its patent claims had been
“confirmed” by the USPTO until just three days before GrubHub’s IPO— a full six
days after the petition been denied. 60 The announcement caused the pending
litigation to become a salient risk factor for GrubHub in the media. 61 Fortune
announced, “Amid IPO, one of GrubHub’s risk factors just got riskier.”62
CNNMoney reported that GrubHub was “facing a potentially expensive lawsuit.”63
Since the USPTO’s decision had been rendered almost a week earlier, the timing of
Ameranth’s announcement raises the concern that the patent holder may have
waited to issue its press release until three days before the IPO to ensure maximum
impact.
Both IBM’s threat against Twitter and Ameranth’s press release both came
days before upcoming IPOs —timing that seems unlikely to have been

56. See Rachel Abrams, Market for Patents Was Softer in 2013, Firms Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com//2014/02/04/market-for-patents-was-softer-in-2013firms-say [http://perma.cc/6HFX-TS8Y].
57. See GrubHub Inc., Securities Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 24-25, 81 (Feb. 28,
2014),
http://d1lge852tjjqow.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001594109/6f68ff88-9480-4835-88e58a4eaa002598.pdf?noexit=true [http://perma.cc/B8D2-MF2N] (describing the Ameranth
litigation).
58. See Erin Griffith, Amid IPO, One of GrubHub’s Risk Factors Just Got Riskier, FORTUNE
(Apr. 4, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/04/amid-ipo-one-of-grubhubs-riskfactors-just-got-riskier/?iid=SF_F_MPM [https://perma.cc/7Z6M-XXDN?type=source].
59. Agilysys, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., No. CBM2014-00014, Paper No. 19 (P.T.A.B. Mar.
26, 2014), http://www2.sidley.com/files/Uploads/Documents/PTO%20Trials/CBM201400014.pdf.
60. See Press Release, Ameranth, Inc., Ameranth’s 21st Century Communications™ Data
Synchronization Patent Claims Confirmed Valid by U.S. Patent Office (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ameranths-21st-century-communications-datasynchronization-patent-claims-confirmed-valid-by-us-patent-office-253417011.html
[http://perma.cc/QL5A-XYCT].
61. See id.
62. Griffith, supra note 58.
63. Ben Rooney, GrubHub IPO Delivers: Up 31%, CNN MONEY (Apr. 4, 2014, 4:21 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/04/investing/grubhub-ipo [http://perma.cc/B5W7-PHFB].
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coincidental. And similar instances of suspicious lawsuit timing occurred before
IPOs for OpenTable, Google, and PayPal. 64 Litigation against PayPal actually led
to a weeklong delay in the company’s 2002 IPO, in part to refile the S-1 with the
SEC in order to reflect the new development. 65 In PayPal’s answer to the
complaint filed by Certco, PayPal accused Certco of filing the lawsuit “with the
intent that it would disrupt PayPal’s initial public offering” and claimed that the
delay resulted in damages to PayPal. 66
In addition to the possibility of concerns over the potential impact on
innovation and the patent system, patent demand activity timed in relation to
stock offerings such as IPOs could raise other concerns. In theory, such
strategically timed behavior could suggest that a competitor is trying to harm a
company it sees as a potential threat by reducing the amount of money the
company can raise in its IPO. For example, in a 2006 complaint, GoDaddy accused
a competitor, j2 Global, of this behavior, stating that an infringement lawsuit filed
by j2 Global was meant to prevent GoDaddy from successfully completing its IPO,
“which would have enabled GoDaddy to compete more effectively with j2.”67
Securities regulators also may be concerned if investors appear to be
attempting to manipulate stock prices, either before the price is set in an IPO or
after the stock has begun to trade through short selling. For example, a patent
holder in theory could take a short sale position in a company’s stock — essentially
betting than the company’s stock price will fall —and then help to facilitate patent
related actions, hoping to drive down the price. 68

64. See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and
Investors: IP Privateering and Modern Letters of Marque and Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1,
70 n.286 (2012), http://uchstlj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Indirect-Exploitation-ofIntellectual-Property-Rights-By-Corporations-and-Investors.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H6ZBS2N8] (citing these specific cases of suspicious timing).
65. See PayPal, Inc., Securities Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 64-66 (Feb. 7,
2002), http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=1645013 (disclosing the
Certco complaint); see also Verne Kopytoff, PayPal Plans IPO Despite Problems / Patent Suit,
Banking Questions Cloud Palo Alto Firms Offering, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 15, 2002, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/PayPal-plans-IPO-despite-problems-Patent-suit2874230.php [http://perma.cc/H4HW-6UPB] (covering the IPO delay).
66. PayPal, Inc.’s Answer, Counterclaims, and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Certco, Inc. v.
PayPal,
Inc.,
No.
02-094
(D.
Del.
Feb.
11,
2002),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103415/000091205702004798/a2070244zex99_2.htm [http://perma.cc/FF62-VMN4].
67. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 14, Go Daddy Grp. Inc. v. j2 Glob.
Commc’ns, No. 2:06-cv-02474-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2006); see also Robin Feldman,
Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 288-94 (2013) (detailing the behavior
of j2 Global).
68. For an early article speculating about this type of behavior, see Michelle Carniaux &
Michael E. Sander, The Curious Case of New Bay Capital LLC and VirnetX Inc., IPR BLOG (Nov. 22,
2013),
http://interpartesreviewblog.com/curious-case-new-bay-capital-llc-virnetx-inc
[http://perma.cc/48GV-4NMW]. VirnetX, which won its own $368 million patent
infringement verdict against Apple in 2012, claimed that a newly created shell company known
as New Bay Capital demanded that VirnetX pay New Bay $37 million or face potentially
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This type of behavior has grounding in reality. Recent press has discussed the
actions of a hedge fund manager who is betting against pharmaceutical companies
and then challenging their patents, all while investing “in those [companies] that
would profit if the patents were invalidated.”69 His strategy makes use of inter
partes review (IPR), a mechanism created after the passage of the America Invents
Act to allow for expeditious patent challenges initiated by third-party petitions.
The hedge fund manager claims that his challenges will reduce drug prices for
consumers. If a pharmaceutical patent really is weak, then society’s interests might
align with those of the hedge fund manager, making it acceptable to profit from
taking the risk of challenging a bad patent. One would have to be certain,
however, that the hedge fund manager’s interests align tightly with society’s
interests and that no market manipulations concerns exist.
Yet, aside from these stories and assumptions, little research exists regarding
whether these examples are emblematic of a more pervasive strategy utilized
around funding moments. Limited data on the question does exist. In a survey of
startups and venture capitalists, Chien found that “timing [of assertions] seemed to
be dictated by an event in the company’s development.”70 When respondents were
asked to list what they considered to be the triggers for patent demands against
their companies, the most popular answers were publicity or success, a merger or
acquisition, an IPO, and funding. 71 But Feldman, examining patent demands
surrounding the initial round of venture funding, did not find evidence that patent
demands were tied to receiving venture funding. She reported that only 11% of
companies received patent demands within one year of the first funding round,
with 53% receiving their first demand more than a year after the initial round of
funding and 27% receiving their first demand before any funding event. 72
This Article explores the issue in greater depth by collecting data about when
companies receive patent demands. Specifically, we surveyed recently public
companies about their experiences with patent demands surrounding two major
events in a company’s development: receiving the first round of venture capital
funding, and completing the IPO. The goal was to collect substantive data in order
to probe the narrative of conspicuous lawsuit timing on the part of monetizers and
damaging requests for inter partes review (IPR) for the patents asserted against Apple. Ryan
Davis, Co. Accused of AIA ‘Shakedown’ Asks to Drop USPTO Review, LAW360 (Oct. 30, 2013, 6:30
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/483839 [https://perma.cc/8NRG-97FU?type=source].
69. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short the
Stock; Hayman Capital Seeks to Invalidate Patents While Betting on a Drop in Target’s Shares, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-basschallenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408 [http://perma.cc/FF62-VMN4]; see also
Ryan Davis, Hedge Fund’s AIA Attack Should Have Biotech Cos. Wary, LAW360 (Mar. 9, 2015, 2:16
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/628691 [https://perma.cc/KMQ9-J6UZ?type=source].
70. Chien, supra note 10, at 11.
71. See id. at 36 n.29 (“The survey asked startup and VC respondents to identify what they
thought triggered the suits/demands they had experience with. The top answer was publicity or
success (N=21), followed by an M&A event (N=5), IPO (N=6), and funding (N=5).”).
72. Feldman, supra note 5, at 267-68.
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competitors.
C. Identification of Participants
To collect information about the effect and timing of patent demands on
recently public companies, we attempted to identify an in-house legal staff
member for all U.S. product companies that had gone public since 2007. The
particular 2007 start date was selected in order to reach a substantial number of
companies on both sides of the dramatic increase in patent demand litigation that
began roughly around 2009. 73
The first step in this process was identifying the list of businesses that met the
above criteria. A working database of recently public companies was created in late
May of 2013 using data from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, which provides
information on financial transactions, resulting in a list of all IPOs issued on U.S.
markets between January 2007 and December 2012. This database is publicly
available to researchers who wish to conduct further research or replicate the
study. The set of nearly 1200 IPOs was then narrowed to include only the IPOs of
domestic product companies in the same time period. This was accomplished by
parsing the data set to remove foreign companies, “blank check” companies, and
businesses classified as holding, investment, and real estate companies. Foreign
companies were eliminated to focus the study on companies and patent monetizers
that operate in the U.S. legal environment, which does not affect foreign-based
entities nearly to the same extent as those that are domestically held.
A “blank check” company is defined by the SEC as “a development stage
company that has no specific business or purpose,” or a company that is created
with the intent to undertake a merger or acquisition with another entity. 74 In the
raw database of recent IPOs obtained from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, these
companies frequently included the word “acquisition” directly in their name, such
as “Prime Acquisition Corp” or “Highlands Acquisition Corp.” Given that these
companies appear to have no relation to product creation or development, they
were not included in the final survey database.
Holding, investment, and real estate companies represent a broad category of
businesses including investment banks, investment funds, real estate investment
trusts (REITs), hedge funds, holding companies, private equity firms, private real
estate services, and commodities brokers, among other similar entities. We chose
to focus our research on the experience of product companies, given the centrality
of product creation for the patent system. 75 One could argue, however, that some
73. See Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 1, at 42 (detailing the increase in patent
infringement lawsuits); see also id. at 18-19 (offering a rationale for choosing a similar date range
for another study of patent monetization).
74. Blank
Check
Company,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm
[https://perma.cc/LM2P-CLCS?type=source]
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to grant patent rights to promote the
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of these holding, investment, and real estate companies would also be relevant to
include for a more complete picture of all patent demand activity. Other
researchers in the future may wish to either include this category or to parse
through the different types of entities grouped by the SDC Platinum database used
for this study.
The final set of potential contacts included information on, to the best of our
knowledge, all 555 IPOs on U.S. markets between 2007 and 2012 that involved
domestic product companies, representing the desired response population for the
survey. Research assistants were tasked with finding a specific contact in each
company’s legal department, most often the company’s general counsel, who
would have the ability to respond to the survey questions. While contact names
and phone numbers were often easily accessible on company websites, research
assistants did experience difficulty finding e-mail contact information for general
counsel. Creative techniques were used to identify e-mail addresses and other
contact information. Methods included searching state bar websites and using a
company’s publicly available e-mail addresses in order to extrapolate the
company’s standard e-mail format. 76 When other avenues failed, assistants called
companies’ general counsel directly to request participation in the study. At the
conclusion of this process, e-mail addresses were collected for general counsel or
for another legal contact at 406 of the 555 companies in the final data set.
D. Design of Study and Participants
The survey was sent to the legal contact at 406 domestic product companies
that issued an IPO on U.S. markets between 2007 and 2012. The surveys were
distributed between October 2013 and January 2014, and responses were recorded
between October 2013 and April 2014. 77
The survey began with general questions about the respondent’s company and
its recent IPO, followed by specific questions about the company’s experience with
and exposure to patent demands surrounding major funding moments in the
company’s development. The survey continued with questions asking respondents
to give subjective opinions and free-form responses about patent demands. The
questions concluded with an opportunity for respondents to provide contact
information if they were willing to speak further about their experiences with
researchers. Participants were told that their responses would be reported
anonymously. Thus, the data is anonymized and presented only in aggregate and
progress of “useful arts”); see generally Feldman & Lemley, supra note 30.
76. For example, searching for publically available addresses could allow a researcher to
determine whether a company follows an e-mail format of firstname.lastname@company.com
or fullname@company.com.
77. The set of questions was submitted to the Western Institutional Review Board, which
determined that the research met the exemption criteria for human subjects research under 45
CFR §46.101(b)(2). See Letter from W. Inst. Review Bd. to Robin Feldman (Sept. 4, 2013) (on
file with authors).
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anonymized form.
Seventy-two recipients started the survey, and 53 surveys were marked as
completed between October 2013 and April 2014. Two modifications were made
to the initial set of 53 “completed” surveys. Upon inspection of the data, two
surveys marked as completed were removed because no responses were actually
recorded on either survey. One survey marked as incomplete was added to the set
of completed surveys because the respondent only omitted answers to the openended questions presented at the end of the survey. Therefore, the final data set
presented in this study consists of responses to 52 completed surveys. The
response rate was 13%, 78 and the survey sample represents over 9% of the total
identified population of 555 U.S. product companies with recent IPOs.
E. Study Limitations
The research for this study was conducted through a voluntary response
survey. This method poses significant limitations to generalizing the findings to a
wider population. First, companies may have been more or less willing to
complete the survey depending on their experience with patent demands. For
example, if a company has not faced significant patent-based threats or lawsuits,
the potential respondent may feel that they could not add value to the survey by
responding. Conversely, those who have been particularly affected by patent
demands might have a far stronger desire to ensure their experiences are recorded.
The resulting non-response bias could shift the results of the sample away from
the actual characteristics of the population of recently public product companies.
However, as discussed infra, some basic checks of our data set reveal that the
general characteristics of our sample were similar to those of the entire
population.
Using a survey-based research method also presents potential issues with
accuracy. The responses provided represent only the respondents’ recollections
and subjective perceptions, and most data cannot be verified through public
records or other independent means. For instance, it is not possible to
independently verify respondents’ answers to how many patent demands their
companies have received, when the demands were made, and how much the
companies have spent defending against patent demand claims. We can only use
what private data is volunteered by a company’s legal contact. The language of the
questions themselves also introduces some subjectivity. We define “patent
demands” as including “licensing demand letters, threats of litigation, [and]
infringement lawsuits,” leaving the judgment call of what crosses the threshold of
“threat” up to the respondent when determining what constitutes a patent demand.
Respondents may have erred on the side of reporting borderline patent-related
encounters as “demands,” especially since the set of respondents may be already
78. For reference, the response rate was calculated as 52 completed surveys/406
companies with identified contact information = 12.8%.
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skewed toward companies that have been particularly affected by patent demands.
Finally, the survey suffered from a low response rate and small sample size.
Only 52 completed responses were included in the final dataset, for a response rate
near 13%. While this does represent over 9% of the survey “population” —U.S.
product companies issuing IPOs between 2007 and 2012— the sample size is small
enough that statistical significance should not be inferred from any of the results.
In fact, many questions have response totals below 52, especially those that applied
to only a specific subset of respondents. While notable percentages, figures, and
other results from the survey data are displayed and discussed below, any
observations should be tempered by the small sample size. We attempt to be
transparent by displaying survey counts (e.g. “11 out of 52 respondents”) alongside
percentages when possible.
Despite these low response levels, the results represent an attempt at making
quantitative progress toward understanding potential patterns in patent demand
timing. They offer yet more anecdotal and observational data about the extent and
timing of patent demands, especially activity that takes place outside of the
courtroom, setting the foundation for additional research.
F. General Characteristics of Respondents
Respondents could categorize the sector in which their companies operate as
information technology, life sciences, clean energy, or other, with the option of
selecting all categories that apply. The ability to select multiple sectors resulted in
percentages that sum to more than 100%. When “other” was selected, respondents
had the ability to provide a short phrase describing their companies’ businesses.
Two companies that were marked only as “other” were manually added to the
information technology category after the completion of the survey. The two
company sectors were described by the respondents as “internet” and “business
intelligence software,” respectively, and a determination was made that the
companies should also be included in the information technology category.
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Of the company lawyers that responded, 34% indicated that their company
operates in information technology, 26% of the companies operate in the life
sciences, and 12% were categorized as clean energy firms. 38% of respondents
chose to classify their companies’ sector as “other.” Phrases appearing multiple
times in the “other” write-in section included “manufacturing,” “retail,” and “oil and
gas.”
In order to determine whether these percentages matched those of the entire
population of recently public companies, we returned to our full data set of 555
companies and manually assigned each company to one or more of the four sectors
available as choices to the survey respondents. 79 The results were quite similar.
33% of the population was classified as information technology companies,
compared to 34% of the sample. This indicates that our sample does not have a
disproportionate number of information technology companies — a category of
companies that we expected to be disproportionately affected by patent demands.

79. Note that this check of the data set required us to manually code sectors for each
company, while the sample characteristics were obtained through the self-classification of
respondents. We classified companies using the “issuer” and “business description” fields from
the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database, with some additional research conducted online
when the nature of the company’s business was not immediately clear. If online searches still
failed to describe the company’s business, the default sector selection was “Other.” Thus, it is
possible that respondents did not use exactly the same criteria as we did when choosing sectors
for classification. For example, we chose not to include companies related to natural gas as
members of the “clean energy” category.
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Sample (self-reported)
34%
26%
12%
38%
110%
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Population (manually coded)
33%
18%
5%
50%
106%

All lawyers responding to this survey were members of a companies that
completed an IPO between 2007 and 2012, and respondents were asked when
their companies went public. The majority of companies represented in this
survey —75%— went public between 2010 and 2012. Specifically, 23% went public
in 2010, 25% in 2011, and 27% in 2012. The remainder conducted their IPOs in
either 2007 (13%), 2008 (2%), or 2009 (10%), a down period consistent with the
severe decrease in IPOs completed during the economic recession at the end of the
decade. 80

These results are relatively consistent with the entire population. 63% of the
population completed their IPO between 2010 and 2012, compared to 75% of
respondents. The population also reflected the downward trend of IPOs completed

80. See Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J.
FIN.
&
QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS
1663,
at
1678
Table
4
(2013),
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FJFQ%2FJFQ48_06%2FS00221090140000
15a.pdf&code=2b0f8455fdb3b9ea5d1724b76fbc7feb [http://perma.cc/UF6X-Y88G] (providing
data for the number of domestic IPOs each year from 1980 to 2012).
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in 2008 and 2009. 81
It is possible that the slight over-representation in the respondents from
companies with more recent IPOs may be a natural result of personnel turnover.
Companies with more recent IPOs may be more likely to have the same personnel
that they did at the time of the initial funding and IPO, making them more likely
to respond to survey questions about those periods. [LE: the top of this table wants
to go on this page, just make sure it stays with the rest of the table]
IPO Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Sample (self-reported)
13%
2%
10%
23%
25%
27%

Population (manually coded)
25%
5%
7%
17%
22%
24%

Overall, the population data for sector and IPO date indicate that the basic
characteristics of our respondents are fairly representative of the overall
population. This certainly does not rule out the possibility of non-response bias
among respondents, but it does demonstrate that our sample is not prima facie
unrepresentative of the population.
The respondents also were asked about the size of their companies at the
times of the companies’ IPOs in terms of revenue. A majority (57%) of respondents
said their companies had over $50 million in annual revenue at the time of their
IPOs. Twenty-nine percent had revenues under $5 million, 4% indicated revenues
between $5 million and $10 million, and the remaining 10% worked for companies
with revenues between $10 million and $50 million at the time of their IPOs. 82

81. Once again, the IPO dates from the sample were self-reported by the respondents,
while we coded the population IPO dates using information from the SDC Platinum database.
However, we would not any expect any difference between the self-reported and manually
coded dates because the IPO issue date is a fact not subject to subjective classification judgments.
82. The SDC Platinum database did not include a field for pre-IPO annual revenue, so we
did not conduct a comparison of the population data to the sample data.
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RESULTS

The Article divides the results into three primary Subparts. The first Subpart
explores the extent of patent demands against recently public product companies
at four specific points in their life cycles— the period before receiving the first
round of venture capital funding, the year after receiving the first round of
funding, the period between declaring an intent to go public (filing an S-1) and
conducting the IPO, and the year following the completion of the IPO. These
periods also will be grouped together as two broader events for consideration:
namely, the period surrounding the first round of venture capital funding and the
period surrounding the completion of the companies’ IPOs. The first Subpart also
considers the types of entities that issued patent demands at each stage.
The second Subpart discusses interesting drill-down results about the
incidence of patent demands, specifically referring to patterns of patent demand
exposure for particular sectors such as information technology and the life
sciences. The third Subpart explores the perceptions of company lawyers
pertaining to the impact of patent demands on their companies and their
industries, including some estimates of the monetary impact companies face in
defending against patent demands.
A. The Extent of Patent Demands Against Recently Public Companies
In each of four questions, company lawyers were asked whether their
companies received patent demands during one of four periods: the period before
the first round of venture funding, the year after receiving the first funding round,
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the period between declaring an intent to go public (filing an S-1) and conducting
the IPO, and the year after the IPO. Patent demands were defined on a broad scale,
encompassing both threats and actual lawsuits. Examples of patent demands
provided in the survey language were “licensing demand letters, threats of
litigation, [and] infringement lawsuits.” The language was intentionally broad so
as to include all patent-related legal activity that could affect a company’s business
or costs.
Before the first round of venture capital funding, the survey responses
indicated very low levels of patent demand activity among all responding
companies. Only two of fifty responding company lawyers said they received any
sort of patent demand at this point in their company’s development.

No evidence was found of patent demand activity timed to the year
immediately following the first venture capital round. Only four of forty-nine
respondents reported receiving patent demands during the year following the first
funding round.
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When these two periods are combined for analysis —the periods before and
directly after the first round of venture capital funding — the number of companies
receiving demands was still very small. Making sure not to double-count
companies that received patent demands both before and after the first round, just
five of fifty responding companies reported patent demand activity surrounding
the first funding round. Thus, there is no evidence that recently public companies
were targeted for patent demands near their first major round of funding in a
widespread manner.
There was, however, an indication that patent demand activity rose
considerably as the survey companies worked through the IPO process. In the
period between filing an S-1 with the SEC and actually completing the IPO, ten of
the fifty-two responding companies, about one-fifth of the sample, reported
receiving patent demands. This is a visible jump from the low patent demand
activity recorded around the first venture capital funding event, and its
significance is bolstered by the relatively short time period covered by this
question. While all other periods examined in this study cover a year or more, the
period between filing the initial S-1 and completing the IPO is often only a couple
months in length. 83 The high number of demands over such a short period
supports the conclusion that parties are systematically taking advantage of timing
83. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 49, at 47-53 (supporting the standard length
of time between the Form S-1 filing and completing the IPO); See Myers, Contente, Millman &
Roberts, supra note 49, at 32-33 (supporting a timeline of about 9-10 weeks from the draft Form
S-1 filing to launch of the IPO).
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to extract patent-related revenues or to achieve some other goal. The final section
of the Article will explore hypotheses to explain this behavior.

The greatest amount of patent demand activity against recently public
companies came within one year of the companies’ IPOs. Sixteen of fifty-two
respondents, or 31%, reported receiving patent demands during this period.
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For each period, companies affected by patent demands had the opportunity
to indicate whether demands originated from monetizers, other product
companies, or both during the period. 84 In the period between the S-1 filing and
the IPO, six of ten companies reported demands issued by patent monetizers,
while only four of ten reported demands originating from other product
companies. All but one company indicated receiving between one and three patent
demands during this period, with one reporting six or more demands.
In the year after the IPO, the number of patent demands also rose sharply, as
did the proportion of demands issued by monetizers. In earlier periods, all but one
company had indicated receiving just one to three patent demands during the
periods in question. In the year following the IPO, only 50% of companies
receiving demands indicated receiving one to three demands. Twenty-five percent
received four or five demands, while another 25% reported receiving six or more
patent demands in the year following the IPO.

Meanwhile, thirteen of sixteen respondents, or 81%, reported that at least
some patent demand activity against their company originated from patent
monetizers in the year after the IPO, compared to just three companies noting
demands issued by other product companies. 85

84. Respondents could also note if they were unclear about the identity of the entity
issuing one or more of the demands, allowing response totals to exceed 100%.
85. One company said they were unclear about the type of company that issued one or
more of the patent demands, so the total exceeded 100% for this question.
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When the two periods —the period between the S-1 filing and the IPO issue
date, and the year following the IPO —were combined for analysis, twenty-one of
fifty-two companies reported receiving patent demands either shortly before or
after their IPO. This represents 40% of all respondents. This stands in direct
contrast to the level of patent demand activity surrounding the first round of
capital funding, when only five of fifty companies received patent demands.
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These results offer evidence that patent monetizers specifically time their
demand activity to a company’s IPO. Not only did a higher proportion of the
sample receive patent demands just before and after their IPO than during the first
funding round, but a higher proportion of companies received a greater number of
demands, and more companies received those demands from patent monetizers.
The motive behind this potential timing pattern may have no single
explanation. As previously explained, the anecdotal rationale is that patent
monetizers take advantage of a company’s public vulnerability during the IPO
process to gain leverage, with the hope that companies are quick to agree to
settlements and licensing fees in order to avoid press that might raise questions for
potential investors.
One analogy to the “leverage” strategy is the near-universal litigation that
arises near corporate mergers and takeovers. 86 Cain and Solomon found that
almost 95% of large merger deals in 2014 experienced litigation —as they note, “if a
target announces a takeover it should assume that it and its directors will be
sued.”87 At the heart of this litigation, mostly filed by shareholders, might be a
similar attempt to gain leverage and extract a settlement during a time of great
scrutiny for a company. In a comprehensive study of all securities class actions,
Baker and Griffith note that pending mergers are a classic example of a pressure
point that might lead a business to settle at a point that is “earlier-than-optimal.”88
As they explain, “Our participants reported that the immediate impetus to settle is
likely to be a corporate event —a change of CEO, merger, or acquisition
transaction, or other corporate event that causes the defendant to wish to
eliminate contingent liabilities.”89 The result is that, not unlike many defendants
facing patent demands, the parties settle although it “may be more advantageous to
continue to resist settlement.”90 The leverage explanation would function similarly
for monetizers looking to take advantage of companies nearing their IPOs. A
company’s wish to “eliminate contingent liabilities” during a public corporate event
supersedes the strength of any position it may otherwise have in the pending
litigation. Thus, monetizers may be taking advantage of this pressure-point event
following a path that securities litigation plaintiffs have pursued.
The leverage theory, however, does not fully explain why patent demand
activity —at least in this survey —is higher after the IPO than before. The increase

86. We thank Abraham Cable for suggesting this connection.
87. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014 2 tbl.A

(working paper, Feb. 20, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567902.
[http://perma.cc/NV2B-G7FZ] In this case, “large” is defined as having a transaction size over
$100 million.
88. Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, How The Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance
and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, at 818 (2009).
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/102-bakergriffith157upalrev7552009pdf.
[https://perma.cc/98PU-AWHG]
89. Id. at 778 n. 97.
90. Id. at 816.
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could suggest that companies with “full pockets” from their recent IPO are
perceived as a good target for those who would like to extract a demand
settlement. One recent study supports this claim, finding that firms were 50%
more likely to be sued by a monetizer following a large, positive cash shock. 91
Cash shocks were also a “large and significant predictor” of the number of times
firms were sued by monetizers. 92 Importantly, these results held only for
monetizers and not for product companies. Finally, the authors found that no
other form of litigation evidences this type of cash targeting behavior— not torts,
contracts, securities, environmental, or labor law. 93
Another explanation might combine the “leverage” and “full pockets”
strategies. Companies are still publicly vulnerable in the weeks and months
following the completion of their IPOs —early performance on the stock market is
watched closely and factors into a company’s reputation and future outlook. 94 This
vulnerability, plus the a company’s recent windfall from its IPO, might make
litigation more attractive shortly after an IPO than shortly before. 95
Also lending credence to the “full pockets” theory is data from the survey,
showing that fourteen of the sixteen companies (88%) that received patent
demands in the year after their IPOs already had annual revenues over $50 million
at the time of their IPOs. A majority of companies receiving patent demands
shortly before their IPOs also had revenues above $50 million at the time of their
IPOs. This result can be compared to the work of Chien as well as that of Bessen
and Meurer, who describe patent demands as mainly directed against companies
with less than $10 million in annual revenue and overwhelmingly directed against
companies with less than $100 million in annual revenue. 96 Our survey asked only
about patent demands near particular events in a company’s development, while
Chien, Bessen, and Meurer looked at all patent demands, so our finding does not
stand in direct contrast. But it suggests that patent monetizers may partially
augment their strategy of inducing settlements from small startups in order to
attack higher-value companies near or shortly after their IPOs, when the
companies are particularly vulnerable and public valuations are particularly
sensitive to setbacks.
91. Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence
from Targeted Firms 18 (Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 15-002, July 14, 2015),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/15-002_6806e22c-a7a6-45d8-bf1a78cad85f20f5.pdf.
92. Id. at 30.
93. Id. at 3.
94. See, e.g., Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Stock Almost Hits IPO Price, 14 Months After Rocky
Debut, REUTERS, (July 30, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-facebookipoprice-idUSBRE96T1CI20130730 [http://perma.cc/S49T-F47V] (detailing Facebook’s welldocumented issues after its IPO that made the company’s stock, as Reuters puts it, “a Wall Street
punch line”).
95. We again thank Abraham Cable for suggesting this explanation.
96. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 9, at 397-98; See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra
note 7, at 471.; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 9, at 397-98.
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Alternatively, a company’s increased visibility surrounding an IPO also could
lead others to notice its rise and consider making patent demands. Under this
“information” theory, it is possible that the publicity from an IPO would allow a
patent holder to realize that its patents have been infringed, thus leading to a
perfectly legitimate patent claim. Further, the public disclosure of information
approaching the IPO could reduce existing information asymmetries and give
patent holders new information that was previously unavailable during the early
history of the company. This information could provide a potential plaintiff with
the necessary data to evaluate whether infringement is actually taking place and
whether an infringement suit has a reasonable possibility of success.
Responses related to product company assertion, however, cast doubt on this
“information” hypothesis. In particular, respondents did not receive more demands
from product companies after the respondents’ IPOs than after first funding
rounds. The number of companies affected by demands from product companies
remained small —and actually decreased in proportion as a result of increased
monetizer demands —with each successive survey period.
Specifically, thirteen of sixteen respondents received demands from
monetizers in the year following their IPOs, compared to just two of four
companies in the year after the first venture rounds. In comparison, only three of
sixteen companies attributed some of their patent demands to product companies
in the year after their IPO, similar to the two companies that received demands
from product companies in the year following their first venture round. The stark
differential between the increase in monetizer activity and the relative stability of
product company activity calls the “information” argument into question. If patent
holders needed more information to launch their demands, we would predict the
number of product company demands to rise along with monetizer demands. In
other words, if the problem is lack of information until the IPO, we would expect
both product companies and monetizers to increase their activity near the IPO.
That pattern does not materialize here, and the fact that only monetizer activity
increased suggests that other factors, such as the existence of deep pockets and
favorable leverage are at play.
Regardless of the rationale, the initial evidence presented here indicates that
patent monetizers are not targeting companies for lawsuits solely based on the
legitimacy of their potential patent claims. While the survey did not ask
respondents about their exposure to patent demands throughout all stages of their
company’s history, the data does show that few of these recently public companies
received patent demands during the initial funding stage. But, in the period
between filing the S-1 and the year after the IPO was completed, over 40% of the
surveyed companies received patent demands, with many receiving more than
one. We would not expect demand activity to differ so strongly between these two
major funding events in a company’s development if legitimacy of claims or
likelihood of patent infringement are the only impetuses for patent demand
activity. The legitimacy of a patent claim against a company should not improve as
that company grows, nor should it increase once that company becomes publicly
traded. Thus, if the claims were solely based on legitimacy, one would expect those
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claims to be launched at a company, regardless of how deep the company’s pockets
were.
In fact, Love has suggested that patent monetizers assert patents later in their
term than product companies and are responsible for most patent infringement
claims litigated in the last few years of patent terms. 97 Considering that product
companies mainly enforce their patents shortly after issuance, delays in asserting
patents or clusters of demands near funding events would suggest motives other
than pure enforcement for filing lawsuits or issuing demands. 98 The fact that
demands are clustered near certain funding events casts doubt on “virtuous”
innovation-boosting or inventor-protecting explanations for patent monetizer
assertions, and suggests that patent monetizer activity is driven by the status of a
target company and the potential lawsuit value that status might create. From this
perspective, the study provides further evidence of the extent to which the
economics of patent litigation, rather than the legitimacy of demands, drives
patent assertion.
Should we be concerned about this behavior? Put another way, is it a problem
that monetizer activity is driven by “full pockets,” “leverage,” or “visibility” motives?
Many different forms of litigation are influenced by parties seeking defendants
with “full pockets.” From personal injury litigation to class action lawsuits, a
rewarding payday is frequently part of the calculation behind filing a lawsuit. The
collection of damages is one of our core legal mechanisms to right wrongs and
compensate for harms. Nor is that motive necessarily malicious or marked by
greed. Potential damages must exceed the costs of often-expensive litigation to be
worthwhile; for that same reason, a patent holder cannot sue all potential
infringers.
There is, of course, a threshold of monetary value before which it would not
make sense for a patent holder to pursue litigation. That inflection point,
however, should come long before an infringing company is undertaking its IPO.
As mentioned above, a majority of companies that received patent demands
shortly before or after their IPOs had annual revenues over $50 million. One
would expect a lawsuit to be valuable well before a company reached this level of

97. See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could A Patent Term
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2013),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1388&context=penn_law_review
[HTTP://PERMA.CC/BW4P-DMHQ] (concluding that NPEs “begin asserting their patents
relatively late in the patent term” and “are the dominant source of patent enforcement in the
final few years of the patent term”). However, Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss have observed that Love
studied patents that mostly expired between 2010 and 2012. Since the general increase in
monetizer litigation also took place during these years, the level of litigation that Love observed
in the final years of patent terms may be related to this overall rise in litigation. For a more
detailed discussion of this issue, see Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, AIA 500 Expanded, supra note 1, at
71-75.
98. See id. at 1316-17 (discussing why product companies would be expected to assert
their patents as soon as possible after issuance, and why monetizers would not follow the same
timeline).
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revenue, especially in light of the fact that many monetizer lawsuits are directed
toward companies with far less revenue.
In addition, it is important to remember that patents are no more than
government grants. Congress grants these privileges for a limited time and a
limited purpose —specifically, to promote the progress of “the useful arts.”99 To
the extent society believes patents are being diverted to other purposes, such as
rent-seeking activity that does not promote innovation, the government has both
the right and the responsibility to respond.
Finally, IPO focused patent suits raise another concern regarding harm to
innovation. By “lying in wait” for an opportune moment before making a patent
demand, a patent holder may create circumstances in which a potentially
infringing company digs itself deeper into the trenches of infringement. If a valid
patent demand had been presented earlier, a company could have paid the
appropriate license fee, innovated around the patent, or otherwise modified
business plans in a way that allows the company to move forward while respecting
existing intellectual property rights. Further, the passage of time may make it
increasingly difficult for a company to present a defense of invalidity, especially in
software and technology industries where evidence of prior use on websites and in
code may be deleted or muddled through constant updating and iteration. 100
In a recent en banc opinion, the Federal Circuit applied similar reasoning in an
opinion upholding laches as a defense to bar recovery of pre-suit damages in patent
infringement cases where delay in bringing suit is “unreasonable and inexcusable”
and caused the alleged infringer to suffer “material prejudice.”101 Giving an
example of where a laches defense might be justifiable, the Federal Circuit said the
following:
“For example, in the medical device industry, a company may independently
develop an invention and spend enormous sums of money to usher the
resultant product through regulatory approval and marketing, only to have a
patentee emerge six years later to seek the most profitable six years of
revenues.”102
99. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to grant patent rights to promote the
progress of “useful arts”).
100. See Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellees, SCA Hygiene Prods. v. First Quality Baby Prods., No. 2013-1564,
2015 WL 5474261 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 2015) (en banc) (No. 201 at *8-13),
https://www.eff.org/files/2015/04/28/eff_amicus_sca_v_first_quality.pdf
(explaining
the
impact of delayed suits in high technology industries).
101. SCA Hygiene Prods.. v. First Quality Baby Prods., No. 2013-1564, 2015 WL 5474261, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 2015) (en banc) (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chiades Const. Co., 960 F.2d
1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
102. SCA Hygiene, 2015 WL 5474261, at *15 (giving an example of a situation where
lawsuit delay can cause harm, thus distinguishing patent from copyright, a field in which a laches
defense is not permitted and in which independent invention can serve as a defense). The quote
refers to the specific period of “six years” because 35 U.S.C. § 286 limits recovery of damages to
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The IPO situation is comparable. If a patent holder chooses to sue near a
company’s IPO just because of opportune timing, the defendant’s infringing
behavior likely began years before the IPO. During the delay in bringing suit, the
company continues with product or service development, only to be hit by a
demand during their most publicly vulnerable moment.
One could argue that any sympathy, however, would be simply a deference to
willful ignorance. Patents are published and publicly disclosed, after all, and
companies should be on notice of any potential infringement. This argument
assumes, however, that all patent claims are well-written, that a patent’s scope is
clearly defined, and that companies can anticipate which of the myriad claims in
the millions of patents outstanding will be launched at them. None of these factors
appears to be true in the modern patent system. 103
The harm to society comes in the form of deadweight loss and opportunity
cost —deadweight loss in the form of wasted spending on products and
innovations long after an infringement claim was viable, and opportunity cost in
the form of alternative ventures that could have been explored if a legitimate
demand was brought in due course. As a brief quoted by the Federal Circuit
lamented, “there is a recurring risk that a stale patent claim will inflict significant
hardship on a defendant who has lost the meaningful ability to choose between
alternative technologies and whose investment in research, development, and
further innovation may be jeopardized.”104
B. The Extent of Patent Demands By Sector
Potential patterns in the timing of patent demands were clearer for some
industries. Excluding the group of companies that fell into the category of “other,”
the most represented sector in the survey was information technology, with
seventeen respondents (34%) choosing this sector. 105 Exploring this sector in
particular is important to understanding the patent monetization issue. The rise in
patent demands has particularly affected software and technology companies,
mainly because many software patents suffer from obviousness or non-novel
claims, making technology companies vulnerable to patent assertions even if

the six years prior to the complaint in patent infringement cases. SCA Hygiene, 2015 WL
5474261, at *7.
103. ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 2 (2012) (describing the many causes of
uncertainty in the boundaries of patent rights); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 45 (2013); Mark A. Lemley,
Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500–01 (2001).
104. Brief of Dell, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, SCA
Hygiene Prods. v. First Quality Baby Prods., No. 2013-1564, 2015 WL 5474261 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18,
2015) (en banc) (No. 198 at *27), quoted in SCA Hygiene, 2015 WL 5474261, at *15.
105. Respondents could identify more than one sector for their company.
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infringement claims would likely be unsuccessful in court. 106
None of the seventeen information technology respondents reported
receiving patent demands either before the first round of venture capital funding
or in the year following the funding round. The sample size for this cross-section
is, of course, quite small, but it offers the suggestion that information technology
companies are receiving few patent demands while they are still in their relative
infancy.
In contrast, a higher proportion — five of seventeen (29%) —of information
technology companies received demands between the S-1 filing and IPO issue
date. During the combined period between the S-1 and the year after the IPO issue
date, ten of the seventeen information technology respondents (59%) said they
received patent demands. The small sample size does not allow us to determine
whether this finding is statistically significant or significantly different from the
proportion of all respondents receiving patent demands near their IPOs (40%).
However, the sheer disparity in patent demand activity— with no IT companies
affected during the initial funding stage and a majority affected near their IPOs —is
suggestive of a larger trend. It is yet another indication that technology companies
are disproportionately affected by patent demand activity.

A sizable majority of information technology companies reported that the
demands originated from patent monetizers rather than from other product

106. See Section I, supra, (discussing the fact that the complexity of the patent system and
high costs of litigation encourage settlements and extraction of licensing fees regardless of
whether the patent holder is likely to prevail).
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companies. In each of the two near-IPO periods —shortly before the IPO and the
year after the IPO —just one company reported receiving demands from another
product company. All other patent demands were attributed to patent monetizers.
Similar, but less dramatic patterns were observed from the small sets of life
science and clean energy companies that responded to the survey. Little to no
patent demand activity was reported surrounding the first round of venture capital
funding. For companies in the life sciences, patent demand activity increased
surrounding the IPO but remained minimal. Half —three of six —of the companies
that identified as members of the clean energy sector reported receiving patent
demands in one or both of the periods surrounding the IPO.
C. The Impact of Patent Demands Against Recently Public Companies
The survey also allowed respondents to provide subjective feedback about
the impact of patent demands. Company lawyers were first asked whether patent
demands are a significant problem in their sector or industry. A large majority of
respondents (thirty-four of fifty-two respondents, or 66%) agreed that patent
demands were a “problem” in their sectors, with 31% labeling them a “widespread
problem” and 35% calling them a “limited problem.” Only twelve respondents
(23%) said patent demands were “not much of a problem at all.”

Information technology companies, which incurred higher levels of patent
demand activity than any other sector in the survey, found patent demands to be
especially problematic. All seventeen responding IT companies said patent
demands were a “problem” in information technology, with eleven of seventeen
(65%) calling them a “widespread problem.”
Respondents were then asked a narrower question: have patent demands had
a significant impact on your company? Some examples of “impact” given in the
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survey were “distracting management,” “expending resources,” and “altering
business plans.”107 Here, 36 thirty-six of 52 fifty-two respondents (68%) said
patent demands had an impact, though only sixteen (30%) said they had a “highly
significantly impact” or a “moderately significant impact.” The most common
choice, made by twenty respondents (38%), was that patent demands had only a
“mild impact” on their companies. Sixteen respondents (31%) said they had “no
impact.”

Fifteen of seventeen information technology company lawyers (88%) reported
that patent demands had an impact on their company, with eleven (65%) saying
the impact was either “highly significant” or “moderately significant.”
Respondents also had the opportunity to provide an estimate of the costs their
companies have faced in responding to patent demands since their inception —
both within and outside of the survey periods. As defined by the survey, costs
could include “time for company officers and employees, costs of outside counsel
and consultants, or other costs.” Twenty-one of fifty-one respondents (41%)
reported spending more than $250,000 to prepare for or defend against patent
demands. Sixteen respondents (31%) said they had only spent $0-$25,000
responding to demands. Twelve of the twenty-one respondents who spent more
than $250,000 were classified as information technology companies, representing
more than two-thirds of the IT companies surveyed. Respondents who chose the
“more than $250,000” option also had the ability to write in the amount spent
defending against patent demands. Respondents who made use of this option most

107. Similar descriptions were used by Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 7, at 472,
474-75 (describing examples and extent of “significant operational impacts”).
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often stated costs in the millions, with one reporting costs “over $25,000,000.”

Notably, when the data set was narrowed to include only respondents who
also reported receiving patent demands during one or more of the four periods
examined in the survey, 14 of 21 respondents (67%) reported spending above
$250,000. Only one affected company said they spent $25,000 or less, signifying
that most of the twelve respondents in the full survey set who chose the under$25,000 category did not face exposure to patent demands surrounding their first
round of funding or their IPO. 108
III.

CONCLUSIONS

Our survey of company lawyers at recently public companies lends
quantitative evidence to an ongoing narrative: patent monetizers systematically
launch patent assertion activity near company IPOs, especially against companies
in information technology. We found no evidence of activity timed to a company’s
first round of venture funding. The high number of patent demands near IPOs,
however, stood in sharp contrast. The activity level, with 40% of respondents
receiving patent demands shortly before or after the completion of their
companies’ IPOs, is especially remarkable when considering the normally short
timeframe between an S-1 filing and the first day of trading. Respondents reported
that monetizers made the majority of these patent demands. Moreover, many
108. Recall that the question asked respondents to estimate their companies’ total spending
on patent demands since inception, including demands that took place outside of the four survey
periods.
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companies received four or more demands in the year after their IPOs.
As expected, information technology companies were disproportionately
affected, with more than half of responding companies receiving demands either
before or after their IPOs. Almost of all of these demands were attributed to patent
monetizers.
Similar to other surveys, respondents continued to overwhelmingly agree that
patent demands were problematic in their sectors, with many also believing that
patent demands had specific negative impacts on their companies. Nearly all
information technology companies agreed with these statements.
Despite a limited sample, the evidence presented supports the existence of a
strategy among monetizers to pursue demands against companies during one of
the most public and vulnerable periods of their development —the completion and
aftermath of their IPOs. These patent demands serve to extract settlements and
licensing fees knowing that companies have insufficient time, funds, and human
capital to spend on a thoughtful examination of the claims. With a foundation
established, our findings will hopefully spur further study of strategic behavior in
the market for patent monetization.
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APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

1. What sector(s) is your company in? (Mark all that apply)
Information Technology
Life Sciences
Clean Energy
Other
2. When did your company go public?
2007

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
3. What was the size of your company (in terms of revenue) at the time of the IPO?
$0 - $4,999,999

$5M - $9,999,999
$10M - $49,999,999
$50M +
4. Did your company receive patent demands (for example, licensing demand letters,
threats of litigation, or infringement lawsuits) prior to receiving the first venture capital
round?
Yes
No
5. (If response to 4 was ‘yes’) How many patent demands did you receive prior to
receiving the first venture capital round?
1-3
4-5
6+
6. (If response to 4 was ‘yes’) What type of entity(ies) issued the demand(s)? Mark all
that apply.
Entities whose core activity is licensing and/or litigating patents

Entities whose core activity is selling products or services other than those related to patents
Do not know
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7. Did your company receive patent demands (for example, licensing demand letters,
threats of litigation, or infringement lawsuits) within one year after receiving the first
venture capital round?
Yes
No
8. (If response to 7 was ‘yes’) How many patent demands did your company receive
within one year after receiving the first venture capital round?
1-3
4-5
6+
9. (If response to 7 was ‘yes’) What type of entity(ies) issued the demand(s)? Mark all that
apply.
Entities whose core activity is licensing and/or litigating patents

Entities whose core activity is selling products or services other than those related to patents
Do not know

10. Did your company receive patent demands (for example, licensing demand letters,
threats of litigations, or infringement lawsuits) between the time that you filed an S1,
declaring intent to go public, and when you completed the IPO?
Yes
No
11. (If response to 10 was ‘yes’) How many patent demands did your company receive
between the time that you filed an S1, declaring intent to go public, and when you
completed the IPO?
1-3
4-5
6+
12. (If response to 10 was ‘yes’) What type of entity(ies) issued the demand(s)? Mark all
that apply.
Entities whose core activity is licensing and/or litigating patents

Entities whose core activity is selling products or services other than those related to patents
Do not know
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13. Did your company receive patent demands (for example, licensing demand letters,
threats of litigation, or infringement lawsuits) within one year after completing the IPO?
Yes
No

14. (If response to 13 was ‘yes’) How many patent demands did your company
receive within one year after completing the IPO?
1-3
4-5
6+
15. (If response to 13 was ‘yes’) What type of entity(ies) issued the demand(s)? Mark
all that apply.
Entities whose core activity is licensing and/or litigating patents

Entities whose core activity is selling products or services other than those related to
patents
Do not know

16. How much of a problem are patent demands against startup companies in your
industry sector?
A widespread problem
A limited problem
Not much of a problem at all
Do not know
17. Have patent demands had a significant impact on your company, for example,
distracting management, expending resources or altering business plans?
Highly significant impact

Moderately significant impact
Mild impact
No impact
Do not know
18. Please describe that impact.
[open answer format]
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19. Roughly how much has your company spent since its inception to prepare for or
defend against patent demands? (Such costs could include time for company officers and
employees, costs of outside counsel and consultants, or other costs).
$0 - $25,000

$25,000 - $50,000
$50,001 - $100,000
$100,001 - $250,000
More than $250,000 (Please specify)
20. Do you have any general comments about your experience with patent demands?
[open answer format]

21. Would you be willing to talk further with researchers about your experiences with
patent assertion and your views on the topic? (Confidentiality would be protected.)
Yes
No
22. (If response to 21 was ‘yes’) Please provide your information below so that we can
contact you about further discussions of your experiences.
[open answer format with blanks for appellation, first name, last name, and email address]

